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Abstract. Most adaptive systems have compensation mechanisms for 
recovering from or preventing failures. However, sometimes a compensation is 
not essential. Hence, diagnosing and compensating each and every one of their 
failures may be ineffective. Rather than polluting a requirements specification 
with fine grained definition of failure-handling conditions, this work aims to 
increase the flexibility of failure handling in self-adaptive systems using 
tolerance policies. We allow the expression of conditions in which certain 
failures may be ignored – i.e., conditions on which a failure will not be 
compensated. Such policies may lead to reduced costs and performance 
improvement.  The FAST framework consists of the definition of a tolerance 
policy, the mechanisms to evaluate this policy and a tool to aid the creation of 
policies. 
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1   Introduction 
Adaptive systems are systems that are able to change their behavior in response to 
changes on the environment and on the system itself [5]. Similarly to autonomics 
systems [12], these systems should be able to change their behavior at runtime with 
minimal human intervention [14][17], even in dynamic environments. In such a 
system, failures are handled with compensations – or recovery activities. At design 
time, possible failures are identified and responses to the respective failures are 
defined. However, these responses may have a significant impact on non-functional 
requirements, such as performance and cost. For instance, the failure of a free web-
service may be compensated through the usage of a similar but paid service. 
Therefore, it is important to allow some flexibility on the definition of which failures 
are to be compensated and on which scenario.  
The notion that different failures have different impacts on different users and 
contexts is widespread on the literature [4][11][21]. So, rather than defining this as 
static requirements, we propose the usage of policies defined during the system 
deployment or at run time. The concept of policies is used in Software Engineering to 
 allow users or system administrators to control some characteristics of a system, 
without having to deal with implementation details [8]. In particular, this concept has 
often been used by the network community [25][24]. In this work we are defining a 
policy to enable the customization of the way that a system handles its failures. 
The FAST Framework – Failure hAndling for Autonomic Systems – comprises the 
policy specification, algorithms to process the policy and a supporting tool. This 
framework was initially aimed to provide this flexibility for autonomic systems, more 
specifically with a self-configuring architecture [19]. In this paper we are going to 
present a generic version of this framework. Hence, a large variety of systems could 
borrow the concepts and mechanisms presented here to enhance its failure handling. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our approach for expressing 
conditions in which a failure may be ignored – namely, the Tolerance Policy. The 
algorithm for processing this policy is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes an 
agent that implements the policy algorithms and the tool developed to support the 
policy. In section 5 we compare our research with related works. Finally, Section 6 
summarizes our work and points out open issues. 
2   Tolerance Policy 
A policy may be seen as an set of policy rules [24], which is formed by a condition 
and its corresponding actions [24][18]. When the conditions apply, the respective 
actions are performed. The tolerance policy is concerned with the definition of 
conditions for failures to be ignored. An excerpt of the conceptual model for this 
policy is presented on Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual model excerpt of the Tolerance Policy 
 
A failure may be a high-level failure – such as the non-achievement of a goal – or a 
low-level failure – such as an error reported by a software component. As default, for 
all failures that have a recovery action this action will be performed when the failure 
happens - only those failures explicitly mentioned in some rule of this policy will 
have its failures disregarded, i.e., will not trigger a compensation. Failures may be 
ignored depending on conditions that may be related
 amount of occurrences of a failure. For each of these types of conditions, there is a 
specific rule type: t.context (ContextCondition) and t.limit (LimitCondition). The 't' in 
these type names stands for 'tolerance'. 
Besides the list of failures that have recovery actions, another input for this policy 
is the context model, or environmental model. The context model specifies the data 
that will be monitored by the system. In self-adaptive systems this data is used to 
identify when an adaptation should be performed and to identify the occurrence of 
failures themselves [7]. In the FAST framework we are considering a context model 
in the form of entities and their attributes [3], expressed in XML. When an attribute is 
an enumeration, this XML also define its possible values. In Fig. 2 we show an 
example of a context model. In this case, there are two context entities: Internet and 
Calendar. The Internet entity has the attribute Speed, which possible values are zero, 
low, average and high. The Weekday of the Calendar may be Sunday, Monday, and 
so on, while the Hour is a number. 
In the following sub-sections it will be described the two tolerance rule types – 
t.context and t.limit. The regular expressions that precisely define the rules syntax are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A context model example. This XML excerpt shows two context entities – internet and 
calendar – and their attributes. 
2.1   Tolerance Rule Type t.context 
In order to express in which contexts certain failures may be ignored we use 
t.context rules. This rule type has the following structure: 
1  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2  <root>    
3      <ContextEntity name="internet"> 
4          <Attribute name="speed" type="enum"> 
5              <Value>zero</Value> 
6              <Value>low</Value> 
7              <Value>average</Value> 
8              <Value>high</Value> 
9          </Attribute> 
10     </ContextEntity> 
11     <ContextEntity name="calendar"> 
12         <Attribute name="weekday" type="enum"> 
13                 <Value>sunday</Value> 
14                 <Value>monday</Value> 
15                 <Value>tuesday</Value> 
16                 <Value>wednesday</Value> 
17                 <Value>thursday</Value> 
18                 <Value>friday</Value> 
19                 <Value>saturday</Value> 
20         </Attribute> 
21         <Attribute name="hour" type="number"> 
22         </Attribute> 
23     </ContextEntity> 
24 </root> 
  
failuresSet isAllowedToFailIf contextExpression 
 
failuresSet is a set of failure identifiers divided by a colon (:), and that has at least 
one failure - i.e., it cannot be an empty set. The allFailures reserved word may be 
used to refer to all the recoverable failures of a system, without the need to name them 
one by one.  
isAllowedToFailIf is a fixed string to identify the rule type. contextExpression is a 
logic expression, with the following structure: 
 
contextEntity.attributeName operator attributeValue 
 
contextEntity is any entity of the system's context model, and attributeName is the 
name of an attribute of that entity. operator is a logic comparator, among the 
following: equals (=), greater than (>), greater equals than (>=), lower than (<), lower 
equals than (<=) and different (<>). AttributeValue is any possible value that entity’s 
attribute may have. During the system execution, this value will be compared with the 
actual value of that attribute, in order to evaluate if this context applies or not. 
A rule of the t.context type has the following meaning: if a failure that is an 
element of the failuresSet occur and the contextExpression currently applies, then that 
failure will be ignored. In other words, no compensation will be performed for that 
failure. 
Usual situations in which a failure can be ignored are those related to date and 
time, as in examples 1 and 2. Example 1 states that if a certain failureX occurs but it is 
before  8 am, this failure will be ignored. The same applies for failureY. In Example 
2, we express that the occurrence of any failure of that system will be ignored on 
Sundays. 
 
Ex.1: failureX: failureY isAllowedToFailIf calendar.hour<=8 
Ex.2: allFailures isAllowedToFailIf calendar.day=Sunday 
2.2   Tolerance Rule Type t.limit 
In this rule type we are not concerned in defining specific conditions in which a 
failure will be ignored. Instead, the concern is to define a maximum number of times 
that some failure will occur without being compensated. This type has the following 
structure: 
 
failuresSet isAllowedToFailAtMost limit 
 
failuresSet is defined as in t.context. The isAllowedToFailAtMost uniquely 
identifies this rule type. limit is a positive integer number that indicates how many 
consecutive occurrences of each failure of the failuresSet will be ignored, before a 
compensation is triggered. 
A rule of this type means that each failure of the failuresSet will have a limit 
number of occurrences ignored. The failure number limit + 1 will be compensated, 
 and the occurrence counting of that failure will be reset. However, the failures that are 
ignored due to a t.context rule are not included on this counting, as it will be explaind 
in Section 3. 
Note that, when using more than one failure in the failuresSet, we do not define a 
limit of occurrences for a set of failures, but  the limit  for each failure of the 
failuresSet. For instance, in Example 3 the limit of 4 occurrences is not for the two 
failures altogether, it is for each failure separately (failureX and failureY). The rule in 
Example 3 can be split in other two rules (examples 4 and 5), keeping the same 
meaning. 
 
Ex.3: failureX: failureY isAllowedToFailAtMost 4 
Ex.4: failureX isAllowedToFailAtMost 4 
Ex.5: failureY isAllowedToFailAtMost 4 
3   Policy Processing Algorithm 
The goal of the Tolerance Policy processing is to define all failures that will be 
ignored. For that, the procedure described in Fig. 3 is used. The parameters are the 
failure itself - i.e., a failed that actually occurred -, a list of tolerance rules, from the 
policy, and a list of context entities, from which we can get the current attribute 
values of that entities. The result of this procedure is the status of the current failure 
occurrence: ignored or not ignored. 
The first step is to check if there is a rule of the type t.context which failuresSet 
contains that failure (line 1). If there is such a rule, we need to analyze each one of 
these rules (line 2). If the rule is of the type t.context and its context expression 
applies, we will label that element as ignored (lines 3 to 9). The analysis of the 
context expressions is performed by the procedure EvaluateContext. The 
EvaluateContext procedure trivially checks if the rules conditions apply [20]. After 
analyzing all t.context rules for the failure occurrence, if it is not yet marked as 
ignored (line 12), we will check if there is a rule of the type t.limit which failuresSet 
contains that element (line 13). If there is such a rule, we will check if the limit for 
that failure has already been reached (line 14). If the limit has not been reached yet, 
we will increase the occurrence counter of that failure and mark it as ignored (lines 15 
and 16). If the limit has been reached, we cannot ignore that occurrence - i.e, the 
compensation will be required - and we reset the failure counter (line 18) for that 
failure. As a result we return the status of the failure occurrence, indicating if it should 
be ignored or not (line 22). 
In summary, the t.context rules define conditions when the occurrence of a given 
failure may be ignored, and t.limit rules define the maximum number of consecutive 
occurrences of a given failure that can be ignored. However, the amount of 
occurrences defined with a t.limit rule does not take into account the occurrences 
already ignored by the t.context rules. In this sense, we can state that the rule type 
t.context prevails upon the type t.limit. Given a t.context rule, the occurrence of a 
failure in its failuresSet will always be ignored if its context expression is satisfied, in 
despite of how many times this failure had been ignored before.   
  
Fig. 3. Algorithm for processing the Tolerance Policy at runtime 
The t.limit rules are concerned only with the failures that were not ignored during 
the evaluation of the t.context rules. Note that the failures ignored due to a t.context 
rule will not change the occurrence counting of a failure. 
Rules can interact. Table 1 for example shows a log of occurrences for the failure 
failureX, considering the two rule types expressed in examples 6 (a t.context rule) and 
7 (a t.limit rule). That table shows the number of each failure occurrence and the 
value of the calendar.day attribute, which is required to assess if any of these rules 
apply. It also indicates if the failure occurrence was ignored as well as the rationale 
for ignoring it – i.e., the rule that made the failure be ignored. 
 
Ex.6: failureX isAllowedToFailIf calendar.day=sunday 
Ex.7: failureX isAllowedToFailAtMost 3 
 
In this example, the failure occurrences for which the rule of the example 6 
applies are failures number 2 and 3. However it is not applicable for occurrences 
number 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, hence we have to evaluate the rule of the example 7. The 
occurrences 1, 4 and 5 were ignored, since they were below the limit of 3 failure 
occurrences expressed in the rule. The occurrence number 6, being the fourth 
occurrence of that failure that were not ignored by a t.context, shall be compensated, 
and the occurrence counter for that failure shall be reset. Since the occurrences 
counter was reset, the occurrence 7 was also ignored for being below the limit of three 
occurrences. 
Data: f : Failure, TR : ToleranceRule[], CE : ContextEntity[] 
1 if ∃ tr1 ∈ TR tr1.type = tcontext and tr1.failuresSet.contains(f) then 
2  foreach trj in TR do 
3   if trj.failuresSet.contains(f) then 
4    if trj.type = tcontext then 
5     if EvaluateContext(trj.expression, CE) then 
6      f.status ← ignored 
7     end 
8    end 
9   end 
10  end 
11 end 
12 if f.status ≠ ignored then 
13  if ∃ tr2 ∈ TR tr2.type = tlimit and tr2.failuresSet.contains(f) then 
14   if f.failureCounter < tr2.limit then 
15    f.status ← ignored 
16    f.failureCounter ← f.failureCounter + 1 
17   else 
18    f.failureCounter ← 0 
19   end 
20  end 
21 end 
22 return f.status 
 Table 1.  Occurrence log of the failure failureX  
Occurence 
number Calendar.day Ignore failure? Rationale 
1 Saturday Yes Ex. 7 (1st occurrence) 
2 Sunday Yes Ex. 6 
3 Sunday Yes Ex. 6 
4 Monday Yes Ex. 7 (2nd occurrence) 
5 Monday Yes Ex. 7 (3rd occurrence) 
6 Monday No  
7 Tuesday Yes Ex. 7 (1st occurrence) 
4   Application 
In order to use our approach we developed a policy manager component that 
implements the algorithm presented in Section 3. This component is responsible for 
loading the policy rules, presented in Section 2, and the context model. Besides, it 
receives updates on the context and assess if a given failure should be ignored or not, 
upon requests of other components. 
For illustration purpose, on this paper we are presenting the Policy Manager 
component encapsulated as an agent - the FAST Agent. This is a way of showing the 
generic characteristic of this framework. We also envision the usage of the FAST 
implementation as a crosscutting aspect [10], in synergy with works about aspectual 
modeling on multi-agent systems [2][23]. 
The exchange of messages between a system using the FAST framework and the 
FAST Agent itself is depicted in Fig. 4. The first two messages are related to the 
initialization of the FAST Agent, by providing the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 
of the files that contain the policy and the context model for that system. Then it is 
expected to occur some messages of the third kind, in order to inform an initial state 
of the context. During the rest of the execution of the system, there will be an 
exchange of messages to update the context (message 3) and to check if a failure shall 
be ignored (message 4). Therefore, the agent is not responsible for identifying context 
changes or the occurrence of failures - it receives this information from the system 
itself, or from a monitor system. 
The policy file is a text file in which each line contains a policy rule. The syntax of 
the rules is described in Appendix A as Java regular expressions. The context model 
is a XML file containing the context entities and their attributes. The context model 
defines the data that will be monitored by the system, and that will be informed to the 
FAST agent. This way it will be possible to assess if a given t.context rule applies on 
a specific moment during the execution. 
Besides the FAST Agent, we developed a tool for making it simpler to create the 
policy rules. With this tool we are able to prevent syntax errors that could otherwise 
occur. Fig. 5 shows an example of the creation of a t.context rule. The user selects 
failures, from the list of failures that have recovery actions, and then defines in which 
context that failure can occur without compensation. In this example, the failures are 
regarding the updating of data on a movie system.  
 
  
Fig. 4. Communication between a system and the FAST Agent 
In order to prevent the user from deciding to ignore a critical failure, the list of 
possible failures informed for this tool may be a partial model. Therefore, the reserved 
word allFailures will not include the omitted failures. 
The rule defined in the example of Fig. 5 is downloadPictures isAllowedToFailIf 
calendar.weekday=saturday. This policy editor tool makes it easier for the user to 
create and maintain the rules of a policy. 
We performed a simulation of the execution of this system, considering two 
variables: the amount of failures occurrence (low, medium and high occurrence) and 
the context on which the failures occur. All simulations were performed considering 
one t.context rule and one t.limit rule. The average result was a decrease of 
approximately 41% on the number of required compensations, preventing the 
computational resources waste of performing these unnecessary compensations. This 
gives a general idea of the suitability of this approach. However, these results cannot 
be generalized to every system. Hence, an analysis of the adoption of this framework 
needs to be performed system-by-system. 
5   Related Work 
There is a series of languages for policy definition in the communication networks 
domain. The CIM-SPL language [1] is a standard proposed by the Distributed 
Management Task Force to specify network policies. Rei [13] is a policy definition 
language based on deontic logic, on the same domain. Other languages include 
Ponder [9], ACPL [22] and PDL [16]. These policies, besides targeting specific 
domains, are far more computationally costly and complex than it was required for 
the framework, motivating the creation of a language of our own.  
  
 
Fig. 5. Wizard for creating a t.context rule 
A more strongly related kind of policies are the policies for deteriorating systems. 
They basically define conditions on which a software component should be repaired, 
based on their age, failure rate [16] and their technological obsolescence [17]. Our 
tolerance policy complements these policies, in the sense that we deal with another 
aspect of failures. 
Another way of providing the flexibility to the user would be by including the 
failure handling in an options or a settings menu. This approach is potentially more 
user-friendly, however it lacks in generalization, since not every system has a 
graphical interface and, in those that have one, the user interfaces are usually 
specifically designed for each system. Moreover, the inclusion of a new category of 
options in the already overloaded options menu [15] could harm the usability of the 
software as a whole. 
6   Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we present a generic version of the FAST framework, which provides 
system users and administrators with the capability of defining conditions on which a 
failure may be ignored. The contribution of this framework is twofold: 
 a) It enhances the failure handling on software systems by including a degree of 
flexibility. This way the impact of a failure is not defined only by software engineers, 
but also by users or system administrators; 
b) It reduces the resources wasted when compensating failures, by reducing the 
amount of failures that require compensation. 
In this paper the policy itself was described, with its two rule types, as well as the 
algorithm used to assess the rules at runtime. Using a policy is far different from 
expressing these conditions directly on the requirements model, in the sense that the 
model is designed by software engineers, whereas the policy is possibly designed by 
the user. 
The feasibility of the algorithm was shown by coding it as the behavior of a 
software agent. A Policy Editor tool was also developed, making it easier for the user 
to create and maintain the rules of a policy. Despite initial experiments showing an 
overall suitability, further experiments on real-world software system need to be 
performed, to analyze the usefulness and the effectiveness of our approach.  
We also plan to increase the expressiveness of the policy rules, allowing the usage 
of logic operators like AND, OR and XOR to create more complex conditions. 
Furthermore, we want to be able to handle more complex rules, which can mix 
different types of a rule.  Lastly, we intend to incorporate a priority policy, to define 
the priorities for the compensation of each failure. 
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Appendix A: Regular expressions 
This Appendix presents the Java regular expressions used to define the syntax of 
the policy rules. 
BASIC EXPRESSIONS: 
Failure identifier: [a-z][a-zA-Z]* 
Failures set: [a-z][a-zA-Z]*(:[a-z][a-zA-Z]*)* 
Positive integer: [0-9]*[1-9][0-9]* 
Undefined amount of whitespaces: \\s+ 
Context expression (structure): ContextEntity.AttributeName operator  
                                                  AttributeValue 
Context expression (regular expression): [a-zA-Z]+\\.[a-zA-Z]+  
                           (=|>|>=|<|<=|<>)[a-zA-Z0-9]+ 
RULE TYPES: 
T.context (structure): failuresSet isAllowedToFailIf contextExpression 
T.context (regular expression): ^[a-z][a-zA-Z]*(:[a-z][a-zA-Z]*)*  
          \\s+isAllowedToFailIf\\s+[a-zA-Z]+  
          \\.[a-zA-Z]+(=|>|>=|<|<=|<>)[a-zA-Z0-9]+$ 
T.limit (structure): failuresSet isAllowedToFailAtMost limit 
T.limit (regular expression): ^[a-z][a-zA-Z]*(:[a-z][a-zA-Z]*)*  
        \\s+isAllowedToFailAtMost\\s+[0-9]*[1-9][0-9]*$ 
